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GDP   gross domestic product 
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EMU and the euro have been existing for more than seven (almost eight) years. As it is known, EMU – 
and in particular the proper functioning of the single currency – requires the appropriate policy mix. But 
there is the significant macroeconomic and institutional imbalance within the euro area stemming from 
the  coexistence  of  the  single  (centralized)  monetary  policy  and  nationally-oriented  (decentralized) 
economic policies that are merely coordinated. Besides the EU economic coordination process and 
the policy mix have many other serious weaknesses. For that reason, in recent years there have been 
numerous proposals of the strengthening the economic policy coordination within the EU, which could 
be implemented in the nearest or a bit later future. They were related to improving coordination of 
economic, employment and budgetary policies within the EU or the euro area (including the Stability 
and Growth Pact  –  reformed  in  2005).  But  those proposals  and  reform  seem  to  be  more  or  less 
enough  to  resolve  some  current  problems,  but  they  do  not  propose  the  complex  and  ultimate 
framework of economic policy within EMU in the long-term perspective.  
For that reason, at the present moment the EU still needs a serious debate on its future. The debate 
on the future of the EU started in 2000 – just a year after the introduction of the euro. After some years 
it might seem that the debate was over and the necessary solutions were found and adopted in the 
Constitutional Treaty. But following the last year’s events (of May and June 2005) – related to the 
rejection of the Constitution for Europe and initial non-agreement on the Financial Perspective 2007-
2013 – the debate on the future of the EU was reopen. Taking into account this crisis situation within 
the EU as well as the fact that the previous economic and political solutions have not been regarded 
as effective, it is worth to consider (or reconsider) some potential solutions that could be implemented 
in the EU in the longer future. For example, in the case of potential economic reforms, it would be 
interesting to consider whether the idea of the single economic/budgetary policy in the euro area is 
feasible (and desirable) in the long run. On the one hand, this idea is an extremely sensitive and 
controversial issue and there is strong opposition related to such a vision in the EU. But on the other 
hand,  it  seems  to  be  very  logical  and  natural  because  the  logic  and  cumulative  character  of  the 
integration  process  indicate  that  the  evolution  from  the  coordination  of  national  economic  and 
budgetary  policies  to  the  single  economic/budgetary  policy  (coexisting  together  with  the  single 
monetary policy) seems to be an inevitable consequence of EMU in the longer term.  
In general, this study argues that EMU will have a serious impact on the further integration process 
within the EU, exerting in the course of time stronger and stronger pressure on its deepening – in both 
political and economic spheres (e.g. by complementing a monetary union with a political union). 
JEL classification: E 61, E 62, H 20, H 41, H 50, H 77  
Key words: EMU, the euro, policy coordination, policy mix, economic policy, fiscal/budgetary policy, 
fiscal federalism, federation, political union  
The cut-off date: 31 August 2006  
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evolutions  from  coordination  of  national  economic  and  budgetary  policies  to  the  single 
economic/budgetary policy in the EU, as well as the usefulness of fiscal federalism (in the 
context of, inter alia, the theories of optimum currency areas), are being discussed in the fifth 
part of the study. The last part concludes.  
The main goals of this study are the following:  
x  to make a review of the economic literature related to the analyzed subject;  
x  to make a review of the relevant documents of the EU institutions (mainly the European 
Commission,  the  ECB,  the  European  Council,  etc.),  as  well  as  some  international 
institutions and organizations (such as the IMF or the OECD);  
x  to propose some potential solutions for the euro area / EMU, which could be potentially 
considered in the future.  
This paper should be regarded as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of the 
EU (and EMU as well) by indicating both some new ideas as well as some forgotten ones 
that  perhaps  could  be  reconsidered  once  again  (if  not  today,  at  least  in  the  longer 
perspective).
IntroductionPresent framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 
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The main targets of the Lisbon Strategy – progress in the Member States (as of January 2005)
1 if data not available for reference year, earlier data has been taken for some of the Member States.  
Source: Commission 2005h.
Unfortunately, in  the  subsequent  years  the  overall  macroeconomic  situation  in  the 
world – and thereby in Europe as well – deteriorated considerably (partly due to normal 
cyclical fluctuations and partly as a result of growing uncertainty and geopolitical tensions, 
particularly after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States
8). Real GDP growth 
dropped  significantly,  reached  historically  lower  levels  and  maintained  at  those  levels  for 
some years (especially in Europe or, more precisely, in th euro area). For that reason, many 
structural reforms were postponed because they had been found difficult to implement in 
such  a  poor  macroeconomic  environment.  In  consequence,  many  targets  of  the  Lisbon 
8 For a more detailed analysis on economic consequences of terrorism and assessment of the global economic 
outlook and policies following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, see e.g.: IMF 2001; OECD 2002. Present framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 
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

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

           
          

            
             


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x  second, weak “political ownership” of the EU economic coordination process by the 
Member States, which undermines the effectiveness of the coordination procedures – 
one  of  the  reasons  is  the  fact  that  there  is  no  alignment  between  the  European 
coordination process and national budgetary processes;  
x  third,  the  coexistence  within  a  single  institutional  setting  of  both  the  Member 
States  that  have  adopted  the  euro  and  those  that  have  not  done  it  –  such  an 
arrangement was sensible as long as the vast majority of the EU Member States were 
also members of the euro area, but it is not sufficient in the enlarged Union where more 
than half of the EU members will not belong to the euro area for some time. It may result 
in the lack of transparency, inefficiency and even confusion.  
As stated in the report, macroeconomic policy coordination is envisaged in the Treaty as a 
key  feature  of  EMU,  yet  weaknesses  in  its  current  institutional  set-up  do  not  favour  an 
effective process of coordination [Sapir et al. 2003].  
It seems that in order to complete the above list of weaknesses (or to make it more precise) 
the following ones should be added as well:  
x  first  of  all,  the  present coordination  processes are  largely  politically  but  not  legally 
binding. As mentioned above, the only exception is the Stability and Growth Pact that is 
both politically and legally binding and stipulates various sanctions for non-compliance, 
eventually even really painful. But for many (particularly recent) years the SGP has often 
been criticized and there has been observed a growing number of proposals to amend 
and reform the original rules of the Pact;  
x next,  the  serious  problem  is  the  decision-making  weakness  of  the  ECOFIN 
Council which is the key institution in the EU’s coordination process of economic 
policies. The Council’s weakness, being a result of its highly politicized nature, is 
clearly  visible  in  some  crucial  decisions  that  have  an  obvious  political  motivation. 
Sometimes it may be regarded as a violation of the commonly agreed rules (see: the 
Council’s decision of 25 November 2003 [Council 2003c] and the ruling of the Court 
of Justice of 13 July 2004 [Court of Justice 2004]; see also: box 1.2). Such behaviour 
undermines the credibility of the whole coordination process and raises doubts about 
its functioning in the future;
x and finally, the significant macroeconomic and institutional imbalance within the 
euro area resulting from the above-mentioned coexistence of the single (centralized) 
monetary  policy  and  nationally-oriented  (decentralized)  economic  policies  that  are 
merely coordinated. The institutional imbalance is a result of the fact that the ECB has 
no  real  counterpart  responsible  for  the  whole  economic  (and  particularly  budgetary) 
policy in the EU, or at least, within the euro area. The only institutions fully responsible 
for fiscal policies are the governments of the euro-area countries, which are nationally-
oriented, while there is a genuine need to ensure sufficient fiscal discipline in the euro 
area as a whole. Such a situation causes the persistent risk of “free riding” behaviour of 
some  national  governments  –  especially  in  the  case  of  conflicting  national  and 
Community  interests.  And  the  short-  or  medium-term  lack  of  fiscal  discipline  may 
jeopardize the long-term sustainability of public finances. In order to reduce the potential 
risk of “free riding”, national fiscal policies are coordinated, but it may be insufficient 
because of the partisan implementation of fiscal rules at the Community level (what was 
experienced by the euro area in 2003 – just a few years after the launch of EMU). ItPresent framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 
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sufficient incentives to conceive of national economic policies as issues of common 
interest,  not  even  as  a  basis  for  the  exchange  of  information  and  consultation.  The 
commonly agreed coordination instruments (Luxembourg, Cardiff, Cologne processes) are 
regarded  as  imperfect  because  the  procedures  are  too  complex  to  be  operationally 
transparent.  The  SGP  and  its  associated  provisions  do not  constitute  a  sufficient  set of 
principles and procedures to organize economic policies in a proper manner within the euro 
area.  In  particular,  there  is  the  absence  of  a  jointly  elaborated  and  shared  economic 
philosophy (such a philosophy should appear e.g. in the BEPGs). As a consequence, the
directions of the overall policy mix remains uncertain. Observers and markets may get 
the impression that the policy mix results from political and diplomatic games rather than 
from  a  consistent  and  active  conception  of  the  role  of  economic  policy.  Such  a  level  of 
uncertainty may involve some potential costs that should not be underestimated, inevitably 
influencing market expectations [see also: Gros et al. 2000].  
Similarly, more recently, some authors confirm that there is a deep problem of governance in 
the euro area and its present institutional framework is weak. In this context they indicate the 
following problems [De Grauwe 2006a,b]:  
x imbalance between the scope of competences and responsibilities – stemming 
from the fact that some important instruments of macroeconomic policy (related not 
only  to  monetary  policy,  but  also  to  government  deficits  and  debt)  have  been 
transferred  to  the  supranational  (European)  level,  while  political  accountability  for 
decisions  made  in  these  areas  (notably  in  the  latter)  has  been  maintained  at  the 
national level. This is a source of various tensions between national governments and 
the EU institutions (see: section 3.1);
x lack of some important solutions contributing to the sustainability of EMU. First, 
some large areas of economic policies remain in the competences of the Member States, 
i.e. their national governments, and this may create asymmetric shocks (mainly those of a 
political origin
11) undermining the sustainability of EMU. Second, there is no system of 
budgetary redistribution in the euro area, which would compensate its members hit by a 
negative economic shock (such a redistributive system could be a crucial tool creating an 
“allegiance” to EMU, which in turn would be important to maintain its sustainability);  
x incomplete  economic  governance  of  the  euro  area  –  due  to  the  lack  of  a  “central 
European  government”  which  would  be  necessary  to  complement  macroeconomic 
management of the euro area (being, at the present moment, entrusted almost exclusively 
to the ECB). It is argued that such a “central European government” would be the only EU 
institution that could fully back the ECB and its absence is perceived as a serious flaw in 
the present euro-area governance framework, which has to be fixed in the future.  
With reference to these issues, it is argued the above-mentioned weaknesses of the present 
institutional  design  in  the  euro  area  is  apparent  both  in  the  case  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies (the recent is, however, out of the scope of this study and, therefore, only the latter 
will be analyzed in more detail). In the case of coordination of fiscal policies within the euro 
area, the SGP – regarded as the key element of governance of fiscal policies in EMU – is 
indicated as an instrument built on a weak institutional foundation. This is due to the above-
mentioned imbalance between the scope of competences and responsibilities resulting in 
11 The often cited example of such an asymmetric shock was the unilateral decision of the French government (of 
February 1998; with effect of January 2000) to shorten the length of a working week in France from 39 to 35 
hours (in order to cope with high unemployment by forcing employers to hire additional workers).  Present framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 
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limited  to  enabling  the  full  operation  of  automatic  stabilizers.  But  there  were  some 
doubts  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  automatic  stabilization  –  e.g.  whether  they  would 
always be helpful in stabilizing the economy and whether they would be sufficient in the case 
of strong asymmetric shocks.
14 All in all, automatic stabilizers – which are roughly twice as 
large in the euro area compared to the United States – lessen considerably the need for 
discretionary policy in EMU [Commission 2004j].  
Making an overall assessment of the policy mix in the euro area, it would be useful to present 
briefly its evolution since the launch of EMU. In 1999, EMU started with the policy mix 
consisted of still tight fiscal policy (similarly like in the run-up to EMU) and relatively 
loose monetary policy (because of countinuously favourable macroeconomic conditions). 
In general, during the first six years of EMU, monetary policy was more or less loose, except 
for  2000  when  the  ECB  decided  several  times  to  increase  interest  rates  because  of  the 
unfavourable combination of the depreciation of the euro exchange rate and rising oil prices. 
At the same time, fiscal policies of the Member States started to become more and more 
loose as a delayed result of the consolidation fatigue in the run-up to EMU. Fiscal policy of 
the euro area eased from 1999 to 2001 while the degree of easing was reduced in 2002 and 
2003 [Commission 2003f]. Some fiscal tightening started to be observed in 2003 and 2004 
when  public  finances  in  the  largest  euro-area  economies  (namely  Germany  and  France) 
were expected to deteriorate significantly. In those years, the overall euro-area fiscal stance 
(measured by changes in CAPB) was broadly neutral. In 2005, fiscal policy became much 
tighter (see: figure 1.2.a). It seems to be quite understandable, taking into account that since 
spring 2005, the Commission and the Council took actions concerning the excessive deficit 
procedure in relation to six Member States. This fiscal stance is expected to be remained this 
year as well, keeping in mind that since January 2006 twelve Member States, of which five 
euro-area countries, are subject to the EDP. Similarly as in the case of fiscal policy, the
monetary stance started to be tighter in 2005 – especially after increasing interest rates 
by the ECB in December 2005 (after maintaing them unchanged for almost two and a half 
years).  In  the  first  half  of  2006  there  were  some  signs of  a  slight monetary  tightening  – 
particularly after further increasing interest rates by the ECB in March and June 2006. In 
general, the present policy mix of the euro area – in contrast to the previous situation – 
is expected to shift from the broadly neutral stance in recent years to some policy 
tightening  (notably  in  fiscal  policy)  in  the  nearest  future.  Similar  developments  are 
observed  at  the  national  level,  despite  some  obvious  differences  between  the  Member 
States. In recent years (2004 and 2005), the overall fiscal stance of the euro area has been 
expected  to  be,  on  average,  broadly  neutral  (see:  figure  1.2.b),  although  some  fiscal 
tightening was projected or expected in some countries with high deficits, i.e. in Germany, 
France,  Greece,  Portugal,  Italy,  and  the  Netherlands.
15  In  2006,  these  projections  and 
expectations seem to be still valid in most of those cases, particularly in relation to Germany, 
taking into account that in March 2006 – on the Commission’s recommendation to step up 
the excessive deficit procedure on Germany – the Council decided to give notice to this 
14 According to the European Commission, the effect of automatic stabilizers largely depends 
on  the  type  of  shocks  hitting  the  economy.  For  example,  empirical  evidence  shows  that 
automatic stabilizers are quite effective in the case of shocks to private consumption, while 
they are less effective in the case of shocks to investment or external demand [van den Noord 
2000; Commission 2001d; Commission 2004j].  
15 In this context, it is worth to mention that the euro-area members with larger deficits tend to have a more pro-
cyclical stance both in “good times” and in “bad times”; since the launch of EMU in 1999, this has been especially 
pronounced in “good times” [Commission 2004m].  
14 According to the European Commission, the effect of automatic stabilizers largely depends on the type of
shocks hitting the economy. For example, empirical evidence shows that automatic stabilizers are quite effective
in the case of shocks to private consumption, while they are less effective in the case of shocks to investment or
external demand [van den Noord 2000; Commission 2001d; Commission 2004j].
15 In this context, it is worth to mention that the euro-area members with larger deficits tend to have a more pro-
cyclical stance both in “good times” and in “bad times”; since the launch of EMU in 1999, this has been especially
pronounced in “good times” [Commission 2004m].Present framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 
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maintaining  overall  macroeconomic  stability.  Moreover,  the  euro-area  policy  mix  was 
assessed positively because of the existence of an efficient assignment of policy objectives 
and instruments, clear division of responsibilities, open exchange of views and information 
between policy actors, which could facilitate mutual understanding each other [Duisenberg 
2003]. Although the above assessment was made some years ago, it seems to remain valid 
at  the  present  moment  as  well.  However,  some  authors  argued  that  the  macroeconomic 
policy mix in the euro area had been very restrictive since the launch of EMU and based on a 
“new monetarist” approach to economic policy. Instead, they proposed an alternative “post-
Keynesian” approach which – contrary to the strict assignment of macroeconomic goals to 
the  macroeconomic  policy  actors  and  their  instruments  in  the  above  “new  monetarist” 
approach – would require the coordination of monetary, fiscal and wage policies in order to 
achieve growth, high employment and price stability [Hein, Truger 2004].  
Taking into account the above argumentation, as well as keeping in mind that it was always 
expected  by  many  economists  that  the  policy  mix  in  the  euro  area  should  be  aimed  at 
sustainable and non-inflationary economic growth, it is worth to look at some key indicators in 
the euro area – notably economic growth. Before the launch of EMU it was expected that the 
introduction of the euro would be a “remedy” for relatively poor economic performance during 
some past decades (i.e. in the 1970s, the 1980s, and most of the 1990s), when most of the 
Member States experienced serious output losses and high unemployment as a result of an 
unstable macroeconomic environment (characterized by high inflation, high interest rates and 
unsustainable public finances). It was expected that under EMU the euro area would be able 
to address the above weaknesses not only by improving economic efficiency in the euro area, 
but also by providing greater macroeconomic stability [Commission 2004j]. In this context, it is 
possible to assess – even after only seven years of EMU – that the euro area proved to be 
really successful in the achievement of the goal of macroeconomic stability. Despite 
those achievements in terms of macroeconomic stability, the growth performance of the 
euro area has been rather disappointing in recent years. Although real GDP growth in the 
euro area accelerated in the second half of the 1990s, peaking at 3.5% in 2000 (the highest 
rate of the whole decade), in the subsequent years the euro area experienced a protracted 
slowdown  in  economic  activity  –  falling  to  less  than  1%  in  2002  and  2003  –  despite  a 
continuously  stable  macroeconomic  environment  (while  the  United  States  recorded  quite 
strong growth at the same time). Overall, since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, the 
average growth rate in the euro area amounted to 1.8% annually, lagging behind its main 
competitors  in  the  world  [see  e.g.:  IMF  2002a,b;  2003a,b;  2004a,b;  OECD  2002;  2003b; 
2004b]. As far as the present situation is concerned, according to the recent Commission’s 
economic  forecasts  (of  November  2005  and  May  2006),  after  having  reached  an  annual 
average rate of 2% in 2004, growth of the euro area was more subdued last year (estimated 
at 1.3%), but it is expected to return to potential since 2006 onwards (the potential growth rate 
of the European economy is currently estimated to be around 2.0% [Commission 2006a]). It is 
projected by the Commission to reach 2.1% in 2006 and 1.8% in 2007 (what is broadly in line 
with the recent projections of the ECB, IMF and OECD – see: Commission 2005x; 2006m; 
IMF 2006b; OECD 2006b; ECB 2005h; 2006g). The main factors behind the outlook include, 
inter alia, the accommodative macroeconomic policy mix, an acceleration in domestic demand 
and investment, benign financial conditions, an improved outlook in Germany, a robust global 
environment, etc. [Commission 2005x; 2006m; IMF 2006a; OECD 2006a].
17
17 A more detailed analysis of the overall growth performance in the euro area was presented by the author in 
another working paper (see: Szeląg 2007).  Present framework of coordination of national economic policies within the EU and the euro area 




            












               

            








           

















Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU



















          















           

• 
















Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen 
coordination of economic policies within the EURecent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU




















           





•             

                




















Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU












              

            

            


            


               








            


            















Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU
























































              

Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU
WORKING PAPER No. 39 41
2
 





            


              

           


























        


              

          

             
           
          
Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU










           


          

         

            































              


Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU














     






























    
     
















































            




          
               










Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU
























            


             










Recent (short- and medium-term) proposals to strengthen coordination of economic policies within the EU




























































































































































Strengthening coordination of budgetary policies and the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact





Strengthening coordination of budgetary policies
and the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
__________________________________________________________________
As it is known, sound public finances are essential for the proper functioning of EMU. For 
that  reason,  the  issue  of  utmost  importance  is  coordination  of  budgetary  policies.  After 
almost eight years of practical experience related to the Stability and Growth Pact under 
EMU there are both significant achievements and successes (especially its contribution to 
overall  macroeconomic  stability  in  the  EU  and  within  the  euro  area),  but  also  some 
important  weaknesses.  According  to  the  critics,  the  original  SGP  reduced  budgetary 
flexibility  and  hampered  automatic  stabilizers,  worked  asymmetrically  and  focused 
mechanistically on an arbitrary level of nominal deficits, did not sanction politically-motivated 
fiscal policies, disregarded the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area, focused on short-
term  commitments  and  hence  disregarded  the  long-term  sustainability,  discouraged 
structural reforms and public investments, created some tensions and conflicts between the 
Member  States  and  the  EU  institutions,  etc.  [see  e.g.  Eichengreen,  Wyplosz  1998a,b; 
Andersen,  Dogonowski  1999;  Owen,  Cole  1999;  Balassone,  Franco  2001;  Ballabriga, 
Martinez-Mongay  2002;  Buti  2002;  von  Hagen  2002;  Buti,  Eijffinger,  Franco  2003;  De 
Grauwe 2006b].  
At the same time, it should be noted that, according to some authors, a lot of the academic 
criticism related to the SGP was exaggerated. For example, it was argued even in the early 
years of EMU that the original Pact was considerably more flexible than its critics suggested, 
but it had not been sufficiently communicated to the public (and the lack of communication 
was attributed to the political purpose of the SGP in the late 1990s, when it was principally 
‘sold’ as a solid and hard (and thereby perceived as rigid) guarantee for fiscal discipline in 
the euro area – in order to make EMU more acceptable to rather sceptical public opinion in 
some Member States, notably Germany. In general, the SGP was regarded as “not the best 
but better than nothing” [Heipertz 2003; Szeląg 2003a]. Nevertheless, taking into account the 
above  criticism,  numerous  proposals  on  relevant  changes  of  the  SGP  were  raised  and 
considered in the early years of EMU.
3.1. Proposals of strengthening the EU fiscal framework  
First of all, there have been some proposals of internal adjustments which generally would 
be possible under the current EU legal framework (maybe with some small amendments). In 
this  context  the  following  proposals  have  been  discussed  [Buti,  Eijffinger,  Franco  2003; 
Eijffinger 2004]:  
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in improving the assessment of the Member States’ budgetary positions under the SGP, and 
ensuring  that  it  goes  well  beyond  the  simple  verification  of  compliance  with  the  agreed 
nominal targets [Commission 2004j; Flores, Giudice, Turrini 2005].  
As we can see, there were many proposals to amend more or less the original framework of 
budgetary coordination within the euro area, particularly the SGP. But what the press and 
some officials called the reform of the SGP, the Commission tended to see it as an evolution 
rather than a reform [Almunia 2004]. According to the Commission, there was no need to 
change the whole EU fiscal coordination framework because only its certain parts need to be 
changed over time – in line with changing economic circumstances (e.g. the enlargement of 
the EU, consisting presently of 25 countries and characterized by considerable economic 
heterogeneity and diversity). Therefore, when discussing the modification of the SGP, it was 
advisable  to  enhance  the  original  framework  while  safeguarding  its  successful  elements 
[Deroose, Langedijk 2005].  
It seems it was the right approach. In the short-term the SGP should be generally maintained 
in its original form, of course, with some necessary internal adjustments, but without any 
radical changes. First of all, it is easy to criticize, but not so easy to propose feasible and 
acceptable solutions – so the question arises: is there presently a real alternative for the 
SGP (which would be able to replace it at all)? Next, it is necessary to remember the SGP is 
the result of a political compromise and it would be really difficult (if possible at all) to reach a 
new  compromise  on  budgetary  coordination  within  the  EU  (or  the  euro  area)  in  the 
foreseeable future. Finally, any radical changes of the SGP – after only some years of EMU 
– would get the impression that the EU’s fiscal rules are volatile. For that reason, at the 
present moment such proposals seem to be extremely problematic from a political point of 
view. However, they could be reconsidered in the longer term [Szeląg 2004b; 2005; 2006b].  
3.2. Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact  
A turning point of coordination of budgetary policies within the EU (or rather within the euro 
area) was the decision of the ECOFIN Council made on 25 November 2003 [Council 2003c]. 
Before that Council’s meeting, the Commission recommended the Council to adopt decisions 
that neither France nor Germany had taken adequate measures to reduce their deficits in 
response  to  the  earlier  Council’s  recommendations,  and  –  consequently  –  use  relevant 
sanctions against those Member States at that stage of the excessive deficit procedure, i.e. 
to give them notice in order to take measures to reduce their deficits. But the Council – 
contrary to the Commission’s recommendations – decided to hold in abeyance the 
implementation of the provisions of the EDP and not to use any sanctions against 
France and Germany  despite the fact that both countries had clearly breached the 
reference value of 3% of GDP. If the Council had decided to use at that time even some 
“light  sanctions”  (such  as  notices),  it  could  have  been  forced  to  use  “harder  sanctions” 
(eventually pecuniary ones) at a later stage. But – as it is argued by some authors – “the
government revenues and expenditures, adjusted proportionally according to the ratio of potential to actual output 
and the assumed built-in elasticities [van den Noord 2000]. In other words, the structural budget balance or the 
cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB) is computed as the actual budget balance adjusted by the cyclical budgetary 
component  (CAB  =  B  –  Bc),  where  the  latter  is  estimated  as  the  GDP  output  gap  (G),  i.e.  the  percentage 
difference between actual and potential output, times budget sensitivity to the output gap (Į). Hence, CAB = B – 
Į*G. It should be noted that the European Commission uses the values of budget sensitivities which are based on 
budget elasticities estimated by the OECD, i.e. percentage changes in budget items associated with percentage 
changes in GDP [Commission 2004j; Flores, Giudice, Turrini 2005]. Strengthening coordination of budgetary policies and the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
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Source: European Communities 2000.  
With regard to the revenue side, the EU budget is entirely financed by the following own 
resources: (1) duties established within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP); (2) customs duties (the former and the latter are “traditional own resources”); (3) the 
application of a uniform rate to the harmonized VAT assessment base (VAT resource); (4) 
the application of a rate to the sum of all the Member States' GNIs (the so-called “fourth 
resource” or GNI-based resource); (5) other revenues (e.g. income tax paid by officials, fines 
imposed on firms by the Union, late interest payments, etc.). The so-called “fourth resource” 
is the dominant type of revenues in the EU budget – ammounting currently to more than 70% 
of total revenues (see: table 4.1 and figure 4.2). In 2000, the Council’s decision on the new 
own resources system (with taking effect from 2002) stipulated that no new own resources – 
that could potentially allow the EU to increase its budget – would be introduced [Council 
2000a]. At the present moment the EU has no power to create or levy taxes, but it is quite 
active in the process of coordination and harmonization of taxation within the Single Market 
in order to ensure its efficient functioning (see: section 5.2).  
Table 4.1.
The structure of revenues of the EU general budget (in 2005 and 2006)  
Budget 2005  Budget 2006 
Type of revenue 
EUR million  %  EUR million  % 
1. Agricultural duties and sugar levies   1 913,20 1,8 % 1 319,70 1,2 %
2. Customs duties   12 030,80 11,4 % 12 905,40 11,5 %
3. VAT based resource   15 556,05 14,7 % 15 884,32 14,2 %
4. GNI-based resource (‘fourth resource’)   68 884,10 65,2 % 80 562,50 72,0 %
5. Miscellaneous + surpluses, balances and adjustments  7 299,90 6,9 % 1 297,69 1,2 %
Total 105 684,05 100,0 % 111 969,61 100,0 %
Source: Commission 2006b.The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
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currently to about 120 billion EUR per year. In principle, the main contribution to spending on 
R&D should come from the private sector. But in order to achieve this goal it is necessary to 
increase public spending as well, and thereby strengthening the leverage effect of public 
R&D investment on private R&D investment. The EU needs also to step up its investment in 
higher education [Commission 2005j]. It should be aimed at devoting at least 2% of GDP to 
higher education by 2010 – taking into account that the EU spends currently only 1.28% of 
GDP  compared  to  3.25%  in  the  United  States  (the  gap  is  mainly  due  to  greater  private 
funding in the US). Too low investment in education is one of the reasons resulting in the fact 
that today Europe has not a sufficient number of scientists and researchers (about 5 per 
1000 workforce compared to 9-10 per 1000 in the US and Japan) and, moreover, it is rather 
weak in translating results of research and knowledge into innovative (unique, high-value, 
high-quality)  products  and  services  that  could  boost  competitiveness;  in  contrast,  this 
capacity has emerged as the most important competitive asset of the United States [Porter, 
van Opstal 2001].
In  order  to  compete  internationally,  the  EU  (or  the  euro  area)  has  to  deliver  the  above-
mentioned innovative products and services, i.e. some attractive products and services 
that people from practically all over the world would like to purchase. This issue has been 
recently raised by the Commissioner responsible for Information Society and Media, who 
emphasized  the  crucial  role  of  ICT  in  productivity  growth  and  stated  that  the  future 
developments of the whole EU economy  would depend on progress in that area. In this 
context, she recalled that at the moment Europe still lagged behind its major competitors in 
investing in ICT (not only the US and Japan, but also China, Korea and Asia in general). 
Therefore, it is essential that the share of ICT (in the 7
th Framework Programme) would not 
be reduced in the recently agreed Community budget for 2007-2013, but even increased (if 
possible)  because  ICT  should  have  the  budget  that  reflects  its  key  role  for  the 
economy. It is important that the increase of Community funding for ICT research should be 
also matched by a higher share for research in the budgets of the Member States [Reding 
2006]. For that reason – in order to reduce the innovation gap between the EU and its main 
competitors  and  ensure  good  prospects  of  the  development  of  the  EU  (and  euro-area) 
economy  –  there  is  the  real  need  for  a  far-reaching  reform  of  the  European  innovation 
system,  a  new  impetus  to  the  European  ICT  research  and  innovation  agenda,  as  well  as 
focused and coordinated actions in this regard [Commission 2006a; Reding 2006]. The above 
approach was confirmed by the recent Spring European Council (March 2006), which also 
supported  the  establishment  of  some  new  institutions  for  R&D/ICT,  such  as  the  European 
Institute for Technology and the European Research Council [European Council 2006a]. The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
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macroeconomic  criteria  based  on  monetary  and  fiscal  indicators,  such  as  inflation  (price 
stability), long-term interest rates, public finances quality (budget deficits and public debt), 
and  exchange  rate  stability.  Therefore,  it  would  be  necessary  to  analyze  their  recent
macroeconomic performance against the reference values (as in the 2004 Convergence 
Reports [Commission 2004n; ECB 2004d]). Moreover, it seems to be interesting to compare 
it with the analogous performance of the euro-area countries.  
As far as price stability is concerned, all the new Member States have made remarkable 
progress in bringing their high and volatile inflation rates down to low levels (mainly owing to 
exchange  rate  and  monetary  policy  frameworks,  which  have  taken  a  clear  anti-inflation 
stance). As of the end of 2003, some months before the enlargement of the EU, the average 
level of consumer price inflation in those countries reached 2.1% (which corresponded to the 
euro-area  average  at  that  time),  but  inflation  rates  varied  significantly  between  the  new 
Member States and ranged from –1.1% in Lithuania to 8.5% in Slovakia (Lithuania, similarly 
like the Czech Republic experienced deflation in 2003). As of the end of 2005, the average 
rate of inflation increased slightly in the new Member States and reached 2.3% (similarly like 
in the euro area) and ranged from 1.7% in the Czech Republic to 6.8% in Latvia (no country 
experienced deflation last year).  
Together with the above progress in disinflation, there has been impressive convergence of 
long-term interest rates in the new Member States in recent years. For example, in 2000 
the  highest  long-term  interest  rates  were  in  Poland  and  Estonia  (11.8%  and  10.5% 
respectively) and in the run-up to the EU they were significantly reduced – by roughly half in 
both cases (to 5.8% and 5.3% respectively). According to the Commission, the fall in long-
term interest rates in these countries has been fostered by positive market sentiment and the 
decline in risk premiums triggered by the prospect of their accession to the EU [Commission 
2004j]. Despite that progress, just before the enlargement of the EU, the average rate for the 
new Member States (5.3% in 2003) was still clearly higher than the corresponding rate of the 
euro area at that time (4.1%). After the enlargement a further reduction in the average level 
of long-term interest rates has been observed in both the new Member States (4.4%) and in 
the euro area (3.3%).
Turning to public finances, consisting of both general government deficits/surpluses and 
government debt, the picture is mixed. Before the EU enlargement, for the new Member 
States as a whole, the average general government deficit amounted to 5.7% of GDP in 
2003 (in comparison with 4.9% of GDP in 2002), well above the euro-area average (2.5% 
and 3% of GDP in 2002 and 2003 respectively). But it should be noted that there were some 
significant differences between some countries, e.g. Estonia posted a surplus of 2.6% of 
GDP, while other countries had general government deficits ranging from 1.2% of GDP in 
Latvia and Lithuania to 10.4% of GDP in Hungary and 12.5% of GDP in the Czech Republic. 
As assessed by the Commission, the fiscal position of the new Member States deteriorated 
due  to  various  factors,  e.g.  because  of  the  loosening  of  fiscal  policy  (Poland),  slippages 
(Czech Republic, Hungary), and the inclusion of state guarantees (Czech Republic, Malta). 
Moreover,  in  most  of  the  new  Member  States,  general  government  deficits  seem  to  be 
primarily of a structural nature [Commission 2004j]. According to the recent Commission’s 
forecasts  (of  May  2006),  there  is  a  clear  improvement  in  fiscal  consolidation  in  the  new 
Member States (the average general government deficit amounted to 2% of GDP as of the 
end of 2005 – compared to 2.4% of GDP in the euro area). But it necessary to keep in mind The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
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that at the present moment half of the new Member States (namely the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) are still the subject of the excessive deficit 
procedure – as a result of the Council’s decisions and recommendations of 5 and 6 July 
2004 respectively [Council 2004a,b].  
In contrast to general government deficits, public debt levels are relatively low in the new 
Member  States.  Prior  to  the  EU  enlargement,  their  aggregate  government  debt  ratio
reached 42.2% of GDP in 2003, well below the euro-area average of 70.4% of GDP. At the 
present moment this situation looks very similar. As of the end of 2005, the lowest level of 
public debt was noted in Estonia and Latvia (5.1% and 12.8% of GDP respectively). The only 
countries with debt ratios above 60% of GDP were the smallest ones – Cyprus and Malta. 
Although public debt levels are generally low, some countries (such as the Czech Republic,
Malta  and  Poland)  have  experienced  in  recent  years  certain  developments  in  their  debt 
dynamics that – in the Commission’s opinion – may constitute a threat for the sustainability of 
their public finances in the future [Commission 2004j].  
Finally, as far as exchange rate stability is concerned, progress is uneven across the new 
Member States. The first group of countries – Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia – joined the 
ERM 2 and started to stabilize their currencies (kroon, litas and tolar respectively) against the 
euro with effect from 28 June 2004. The next group of the new Member States – Cyprus, 
Latvia and Malta – included their currencies (pound, lats and lira respectively) into the ERM 2 
with effect from 2 May 2005. The most recent participant of the ERM 2 is Slovakia which has 
stabilized  its  currency  (koruna)  against  the  euro  since  28  November  2005  [ECB  2004c; 
2005b,f]. All those countries stabilize their currencies in the ERM 2 within the wide fluctuation 
band, i.e. ±15% around the central parity (similarly like Greece in 1999-2000, but in contrast 
to Denmark – see: table 4.3). Taking into account the Treaty requirement to particpate in the 
ERM 2 for a period of at least two years prior to the convergence examination without severe 
tensions (in particular without a devaluation against the euro), it would be possible for the 
above first group of the new Member States participating in the ERM 2 to fulfil the exchange 
rate criterion in June 2006.  The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
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Source: own elaboration based on: Commission 2004n; ECB 2004d.  
For  the  first  time,  progress  of  the  new  Member  States  related  to  their  fulfiling  the 
convergence criteria was assessed in the Convergence Reports 2004, published in October 
2004 (some months after the enlargement of the EU). Those reports covered the following 
eleven Member States with derogations: the ten newly acceded countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) as well 
as Sweden (which – contrary to the UK and Denmark – has no “opt-out” clause).
46 Progress 
was different depending on a given criterion and a country concerned (see: box 4.1 and table 
4.4). For example, none of the above countries has fulfilled the criterion concerning the legal 
compatibility,  while  the  vast  majority  of  them  have  met  the  criterion  of  long-term  interest 
rates. Sweden has fulfilled almost all the economic criteria, while Poland has fulfilled none of 
46  The  United  Kingdom  and  Denmark  have  “opt-out”  arrangements  stipulated  in  the  Treaty  (Article  4  of  the 
Protocol on certain provisions related to Denmark and Article 10(a) of the Protocol on certain provisions related to 
the UK). In consequence, they have a special status in comparison with the rest of the Member States as regards 
the adoption of the single currency. In 2004, neither the UK nor Denmark were examined by the Commission and 
the ECB in their Convergence Reports because they had not indicated their willingness to join the euro area.  
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           


             

            
             















The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 100
4
 






















              










             

            
             
           

             
            
           

•              


The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
WORKING PAPER No. 39 101
4
99
important  sector  of  the  economy  in  the  new  Member  States  than  in  the  euro-area 
countries. In the former, the average share of employment in agriculture is more than 
three times higher than in the EU. And the share of value added of agriculture is almost 
twice  as  high  as  that  of  the  euro  area.  Accordingly,  the  share  of  value  added  and 
employment in services (being a determinant of modern economies) is apparently lower 
in  comparison  with  both  the  EU  and  the  euro  area.  It  confirms  that,  in  general,  the 
economies of the newly acceded countries have more obsolete structures compared to 
those of the old Member States;  
x labour markets – practically since the very beginning of the transition to the market 
economy,  most  of  the  new  Member  States  have  experienced  a  sharp  decline  in 
employment  and,  at  the  same  time,  rapid  increases  in  unemployment.  The  average 
unemployment rate in the new Member States is almost twice as high as that of the euro 
area. It is assessed that unemployment in the new Member States is mostly a structural 
problem rather than a cyclical one – what is confirmed by the persistence of high 
levels  of  unemployment  in  some  of  them  (especially  high  rates  of  long-term 
unemployment, youth unemployment, and unemployment among low-skilled workers – 
in comparison with the euro-area members). The structural nature of unemployment in 
the new Member States is also confirmed by its concentration in some regions or 
groups in most of these countries – what is explained by rather low occupational and 
interregional  labour  mobility  in  these  countries.
52  The  smooth  functioning  of  labour 
markets  in  the  new  Member  States  is  hampered  by  some  significant  structural 
rigidities, such as relatively high tax burdens on labour, generous social benefits, easy 
access to early retirement and disability schemes, etc.;  
x product  markets  –  with  the  transition  to  the  market  economy,  these  markets  have 
undergone  some  major  structural  changes,  in  particular  through  such  processes  as 
enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization.  In  most  of  the  new  Member  States,  the 
privatization process is almost completed. But in some of them (e.g. Poland) it is still far 
from being completed and the public sector remains relatively large; and restructuring 
the agricultural sector remains one of the key challenges too. Moreover, there is still 
substantial state aid in some of the new Member States – distorting competition in their 
product and service markets (which is still relatively weak in most of them in comparison 
with the EU) and, in turn, having a negative impact on the smooth functioning of the 
whole economy. In most new members, the structural changes of their economies have 
been stimulated by large FDI inflows (mainly from the EU);  
x financial markets – these markets have also experienced some considerable changes 
since the beginning of the transition process, but they still lag behind the old Member 
States in terms of stock market capitalization, liquidity, financial intermediation, etc. (with 
reference  to  the  latter,  only  the  smallest  EU  members  –  Cyprus  and  Malta  –  have 
52 It should be added that cross-border labour mobility between the old and new Member States is also limited by 
some transitional arrangements agreed during the accession negotiations. Those agreements were negotiated 
because some of the old Member States had afraided of serious disturbances in their labour markets after the 
enlargement of the EU – due to expected mass inflows of workers from the new Member States. The transitional 
agreements, which apply to the new Member States with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, may restrict their 
citizens’ access to labour markets of the old Member States for maximum 7 years – according to the so-called 
“2+3+2” rule. Since 1 May 2004, only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden have opened their labour markets 
for workers from the new Member States. In spring 2006, almost two years after the enlargement of the EU, the 
Commission examined the situation and invited the other Member States to open their labour markets. Since 1 
May 2006 some of the Member States – Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland – have opened their labour markets 
entirely. At the same time, some other Member States (especially Germany and Austria) decided not to open their 
labour markets at the present moment – although the economic rationale for maintaining restrictions on the free 
movement  of  workers  after  the  date  of  accession  is  much  weaker  than  often  assumed  before  (see  e.g. 
Commission 2006q). After the next three years, the remaining Member States which still restrict access to their 
labour  markets  will  be  again  invited  to  open  them  –  from  1  May  2009  onwards.  Finally,  on  1  May  2011  all 
restrictions will be removed and thereby all labour markets will be open for all the EU citizens.  The debate on the future of the EU and the euro area – political, economic and budgetary issues 
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Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU
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be empowered to create and levy EU-wide taxes as well as collect tax revenues. Although 
there  are  some  arguments  to  centralize  tax  revenue  collection  (e.g.  economies  of  scale, 
avoiding excessive tax competition), it is argued that full centralization would not be a perfect 
solution  even  in  federal  countries  and  some  taxation  power  should  remain  decentralized 
[Tanzi,  Zee  1998].  With  reference  to  some  previous  arguments  concerning  different 
government functions, given the decentralized incidence of the allocative aspects of fiscal 
policy, collective choices on many aspects of government revenues and expenditures must 
remain on the regional / national level. In the case of the EU (or the euro area) this logic 
would  imply  delegating  the  stabilization  function  to  the  European  level,  but  leaving 
implementation to national governments [Collignon 2001].  
Box 5.1.
Harmful tax competition and practices
In 1998 the OECD published its report on harmful tax competition. In that report there were, inter alia,
the following statements and findings:  
The accelerating process of globalization of trade and investment has fundamentally changed the 
relationship among domestic tax systems. The removal of non-tax barriers to international commerce 
and  investment  and  the  resulting  integration  of  national  economies  have  greatly  increased  the 
potential  impact  that  domestic  tax  policies  can  have  on  other  economies.  Globalization  and  the 
increased mobility of capital has also promoted the development of capital and financial markets and 
has encouraged countries to reduce tax barriers to capital flows and to modernize their tax systems to 
reflect  these  developments.  Many  of  these  reforms  have  also  addressed  the  need  to  adapt  tax 
systems to this new global environment.  
Harmful tax practices (such as e.g. tax havens, harmful preferential tax regimes, etc.) can affect the 
location of financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of other countries, distort trade 
and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax 
systems generally. Such harmful tax competition diminishes global welfare and undermines taxpayer 
confidence in the integrity of tax systems.  
Tax havens or harmful preferential tax regimes that drive the effective tax rate levied on income from 
the mobile activities significantly below rates in other countries have the potential to cause harm by:  
–  distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows; 
–  undermining the integrity and fairness of tax structures;  
–  discouraging compliance by all taxpayers; 
–  re-shaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending; 
–  causing undesired shifts of part of tax burdens to less mobile tax bases, such as labour, property 
and consumption; and  
–  increasing the administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers.  
If such practices have all of these negative effects, they are harmful. However, in other cases, for 
example if only some of these effects are present, the degree of harm will range along a spectrum and 
thus the process of identifying harmful tax practices involves a balancing of factors. If the spillover 
effects of particular tax practices are so substantial that they are concluded to be poaching other 
countries’ tax bases, such practices would be doubtlessly labelled “harmful tax competition”.  
Globalization  and  intensified  competition  among  firms  in  the  global  marketplace  has  had  and 
continues  to  have  many  positive  effects.  However,  the  fact  that  tax  competition  may  lead  to  the 
proliferation  of  harmful  tax  practices  and  the  adverse  consequences  which  results  show  that 
governments  must  take  measures  (including  intensifying  their  international  cooperation)  to  protect 
their tax bases and avoid the world-wide reduction in welfare caused by tax-induced distortions in 
capital and financial flows.  
Source: OECD 1998a.  Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU
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Taking into account the above considerations, it should be stated that a vision of the single 
budgetary policy in the euro area depends on many conditions. It is not enough to increase 
both  the  size  and  the  role  of  the  EU  central  budget  (in  relation  to  both  revenues  and 
expenditures), but it would also be necessary to make some other fundamental changes
concerning the present characteristics of the EU general budget [Szeląg 2003d,e; 2004b]:  
x  to abandon the present rule stipulating that revenues and expenditures shown in the 
budget  shall  be  in  balance  for  each  financial  year  (and  hence  to  permit  for  either  a 
surplus or a deficit);  
x  to provide the EU – or, more precisely, the EU central fiscal authority – with the right to 
borrow relevant financial means to finance its budget deficit (but, of course, with the 
prohibition of borrowing from the central banks).  
And last but not least, it is necessary to state very clearly that in order to make a vision of the 
single  budgetary  policy  within  the  euro  area  a  reality  in  the  future,  the  absolutely 
indispensable thing is political will of the Member States. Unfortunately, presently there 
are neither political will nor social support nor readiness of the Member States to transfer 
their further competences of utmost importance from the national level to the Community 
one. For that reason, a concept of the single economic / budgetary policy seems to be a 
relatively far-reaching vision. Although there are some opinions that the institutional set-up 
for  supranational  fiscal  policy  would  be  desirable  at  an  early  stage  of  EMU  [Buchanan, 
Musgrave 1999], it seems to be more likely that the rationale for common fiscal policy may 
be considerably stronger in ten or twenty years since the introduction of the single currency 
and the single monetary policy [Masson 2000].  
5.3. Economic and Monetary Union vs. fiscal federalism  
A starting point for considerations regarding fiscal federalism should start with the reference 
to the theories on optimum currency areas (OCA).
64 Some pioneer OCA theories were 
developed in the 1960s
65 [Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969] and then regularly 
complemented by some other authors – especially during the 1970s (see: table 5.1). Those 
theories are often reffered to as the “classical OCA theories” (those of the 1960s) and the 
“new OCA theories” developed in the subsequent years and decades [see e.g. Tavlas 1993]. 
All in all, the OCA theories have been developed for over 40 years and they are sometimes 
divided into some phases, such as the pioneering phase (from the early 1960s to the early 
1970s),  the  reconciliation  phase  (during  the 1970s),  the  reassessment  phase  (during  the 
1980s and the early 1990s), and the empirical phase (from the mid-1980s to date) [Mongelli 
2002].
64 The “optimum currency area” (OCA) can be defined as a specific form of a “currency area”, i.e. a geographic 
area of the single currency or several currencies whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged each other and 
can  fluctuate  only  in  unison  against  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  “optimality”  of  such  a  currency  area  is  being 
assessed in terms of several OCA properties (see: table 7.1), including mobility of labour and other factors of 
production, price and wage flexibility, economic openness, diversification of production, similarity in inflation rates, 
fiscal and political integration [see e.g. Mongelli 2002].  
65 It should be noted that some interesting insights in this regard were made already in some earlier elaborations 
of the 1950s (see: Friedman 1953; Meade 1957; Scitovsky 1958). However, they were not always in line (but 
sometimes in contrast with some further OCA theories.  Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU
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rigidities in the EU and in the euro area – adjustments based on competitiveness can be slow 
and involve costly over/undershooting [Commission 2004f]. Therefore, it seems that the euro 
area would not be able to use effectivelly either labour mobility or price and wage 
flexibility to absorb the negative effects of asymmetric shocks. And keeping in mind that 
under EMU individual countries of the euro area have no longer the possibility to use such 
instruments as monetary or exchange rate policies, the only possibility for them seems to be 
macroeconomic (fiscal) policy. It is related to both fiscal policies of the individual Member 
States  being  part  of  a  monetary  union,  as  well  as  to  the  (potential)  single  fiscal  policy 
formulated for the entire monetary union. In the case of the latter it would be possible to 
direct some budgetary transfers to regions/countries affected by an asymmetric shock.
The systems of interregional budgetary transfers are typical for the federal countries (such as 
the United States, Canada, Germany) being monetary unions as well. The main function of 
the federal budgets of those countries is to ensure overall macroeconomic stabilization of the 
economy. And the efficiency of fiscal transfers in providing macroeconomic stability is 
often being measured by the percentage of the negative effects of asymmetric shocks that 
could be absorbed thanks to transfers from the central budget (see: table 5.2). In Europe that 
issue was disscused for the first time in the late 1970s in the so-called MacDougall Report on 
the role of public finances in European integration [Commission 1977], which argued that 
federal  systems  would  be  able  to  reduce  significantly  diffeneces  in  regional  income  and 
compensate around 28-32% of the overall effects of saymmetric shocks (but the report did 
not distinguish between the stabilization and redistributive roles of the federal budget). The 
vast majority of research on the effectiveness of federal budgets (systems) in absorbing 
potential  effects  of  asymmetric  shocks  were  conducted  and  published  in  the  1990s. 
Initially, some authors estimate the stabilizing (and sometimes also redistributive) effects of 
the  US  and  Canadian  budgets  for  even  30-40%  [Sala-i-Martin,  Sachs  1991;  Bayoumi, 
Masson 1995]. But some other authors – analyzing separately stabilizing and redistributive 
functions of the budget – indicated that the stabilization effect of the federal budget is much 
lower, i.e. around 10-15% on average in the United States and somewhat higher in Canada 
[von Hagen 1991; Goodhart, Smith 1993; Obstfeld, Peri 1998; Mélitz, Zumer 1998; 2002]. 
Although results of various empirical studies were sometimes clearly different, it should be 
acknowledged that the degree of stabilization which could be provided by the federal budget 
is really considerable or even impressive – especially in comparison with the stabilization and 
redistributive effects of the present EU budget, estimated between 0.5% and 3% [Sala-i-
Martin, Sachs 1991; Costello 1993a; Bayoumi, Masson 1995].  Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU




Effectiveness of federal budgets in absorbing potential effects of asymmetric shocks
United States Canada  Germany   United Kingdom France  Italy 
Authors
R  S  R  S  R  S  R  S  R  S  R  S 
MacDougall / Commission (1977)  28    32    29        54    47   
Sala-i-Martin, Sachs (1991)  33-40                      
von Hagen (1991)  30-47 9-10                     
Goodhardt, Smith (1993)  15  13  13-24 12-24      21  21-34         
Masson, Taylor (1993)        24                 
Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993)    17        33-42        37     
Atkeson, Bayoumi (1993)    7                     
Gros, Jones (1993)    4-14                     
Bayoumi, Masson (1995)  7-22  7-30  39  14-17                 
Asdrubali et al. (1996)    13                     
Sørensen, Yosha (1997)    15                     
Athanasoulis, van Wincorp (1997)  20  10                     
Obsfeld, Peri (1998)  19  10  53  13              8  3 
Mơlitz, Zumer (1998, 2002)  16  12-20  18  14      26-29  21  38  19-40
Fatás (1998)    11        10     13    6    12 
von Hagen et al. (1999)          0  0,03             
Decressin (1999)                       30-35  20-30 
R – redistributive function, S – stabilizing function.  
Sources: Pacheco 2000; Zumer 1998; 2002; Kletzer, von Hagen 2000; Vigneault 2002.  
Taking into account the above argumentation regarding the relatively high effectiveness of 
federal budgets and interregional fiscal transfers in absorbing potential effects of asymmetric 
shocks, there were some proposals in the 1990s to establish the so-called “European fiscal 
transfer  schemes”  [Pacheco  2000].  One  of  the  first  and  the  most  famous  proposals 
suggested to create a “European stabilization mechanism” – possibly in two variants, i.e. a 
“full stabilization mechanism” (to deal with all asymmetric shocks) and a “limited stabilization 
mechanism”  (activated  only  in  the  case  of  large  shocks  exceeding  the  agreed  level) 
[Italianer, Vanheukelen 1993]. In the subsequent years – between 1993 (entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty stipulating EMU) and 1999 (the introduction of the euro) – there were 
further proposals to establish some similar federal fiscal schemes in the EU, for example: a 
“shock  absorption  mechanism”  [Mélitz,  Vori  1993],  a  “temporary  and  asymmetric  shock 
absorption  mechanism”  [Hammond,  von  Hagen  1995],  a  “EU  stabilisation  instrument” 
[European Parliament 1998a,b], or a “temporary financial transfers mechanism” [Economic 
and  Social  Committee  1999].  Moreover,  as  mentioned  before  (see:  section  4.1),  it  was 
proposed to set up a “short-term economic action fund” in order to support any Member State 
suffering from the effects of world economic turbulences [Jospin 2001].  
The main argument in favour of the above mechanisms of interregional budgetary transfers 
is to provide countries belonging to EMU with insurance against asymmetric shocks and 
hence  to  ensure  macroeconomic  stabilization.  Moreover,  as  mentioned  before,  the 
existence  of  such  a  system  of  fiscal  transfers,  might  cause  that  the  euro-area  members 
would perceive their participation in EMU as less costly in comparison with staying outside 
EMU  (when  they  would  have  to  neutralize  asymmetric  shocks  themselves  –  without  any 
financial  support  from  abroad).  However,  there  are  also  some  counter-arguments  which 
suggest that the costs of implementing such a system would be higher than the benefits, 
there  would  be  large  cross-country  differences  regarding  the  potential  benefits  for  the 
particular Member States, the amount of interregional insurance/stabilization provided by the Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU
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current national systems is more than half of a hypothetical European fiscal federation [Fatás 
1998]. Besides it is often argued that such an effective “shock absorption mechanism” 
could be establish only in a country having the federal structure. And the euro area is 
not a federal state or superstate.  
As it is known, federal countries and their authorities (governments) are usually organized 
on a three-level basis:
x  central (federal) level – i.e. countries, unions, federations;  
x  regional (national, provincial) level – e.g. states, provinces, lands, etc. 
x  local (territorial) level – e.g. counties, boroughs, cities, towns, etc.  
The  outlined  above  standard  organization  of  federal  countries  is  also  related  to  their 
budgetary (fiscal) framework – the so-called fiscal federalism [see e.g. Oates 1972; 1991]. 
Fiscal  federalism  is  defined  as  a  subfield  of  public  finance  that  addresses  the  vertical 
structure of the public sector and explores the roles of the different levels of government and 
the ways in which they relate to one another through such instruments as intergovernmental 
grants [Oates 1999]. Fiscal federalism emphasizes to the coexistence of multiple levels of 
government  and  to  their  interactions,  notably  on  the  financial  side  [Tommasi  2001]. 
According to a popular definition, fiscal federalism is understood as the system of transfer 
payments  or  grants  by  which  the federal  government  shares  its  revenues  with the  lower 
levels of government [Wikipedia 2006].
67
As mentioned before (see: sections 4.3 and 5.2), there are three main budgetary functions
– stabilization, redistribution and allocation – that should be performed by governments. 
In  the  case  of  fiscal  federalism  it  is  possible  that  different  government  functions  can  be 
provided at different levels; it allows to achieve the most efficient and optimal delivery of 
goods and services. Functions related to macroeconomic stabilization (e.g. price stability, 
employment  policy,  economic  growth  and  development,  etc.)  are  usually  assigned  to  the 
central/federal  government  (although  some  authors  argued  for  assigning  some  of  those 
functions, e.g. related to infrastructure and economic development, to mid-level governments 
[Rivlin 1992; Peterson 1995]). As far as distribution and redistribution is concerned, this is 
generally treated as a mix of federal and regional responsibility. Finally, functions related to 
allocation are usually carried out by all the levels of government; functions with a clear local 
dimension (e.g. public security, fire or emergency services) need to be provided locally, but 
functions  with  wider  spillover  effects  (e.g.  environment  protection,  interregional  or 
international transport networks) should be shifted – at least to some extent – to a higher 
level of government (or shared by various levels of government).
Of course, neither the EU nor the euro area is a federation, although there are some federal 
institutional arrangements in the EU, such as the ESCB or the Eurosystem.
68 But being fully 
aware that at the present moment the EU and its budgetary system are not organized 
as those in federal countries, it seems to be worth to consider whether such a solution 
67 It should be noted that although federalism pays its attention on how power is distributed between authorities of 
different levels of government, i.e. public entities, but a very important source of power is also private sector and 
economic interests of its entities.  
68 In this context, it is worth to mention that some authors perceive EMU as a federal bargain adopted by the EU 
in order to provide its Member States with a remedy against the volatility of the international economy – because 
all of them agreed that only federal-like economic and political arrangements would ensure economic and political 
stability [McKay 1999]. But some other authors criticize the EU for the discrepancy between its federalist rhetoric 
and non-federalist (intergovernmental) actions, i.e. between its ideological aspirations and contemporary political 
reality (stating even that the post-war federalist heritage of the European Community has become discredited by 
contemporary politicians) [Burgess 2000].  Potential future (long-term) evolution from coordination of national economic policies to the single economic policy in the EU
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EMU is not just another stage in the process of European integration – similar to the previous 
ones.  The  establishment  and  existence  of  EMU,  and  the  introduction  of  the  euro,  is 
undoubtedly one of the greatest  integration achievements so far (or perhaps the greatest 
one).  EMU  will  have  a  serious  impact  on  the  further  integration  process  within  the  EU, 
exerting in the course of time stronger and stronger pressure on its deepening – in both 
political and economic spheres (e.g. by complementing a monetary  union with a political 
union). In other words, it will affect the EU’s future. Although EMU seems to be limited to the 
euro area only, it will influence all the Member States of the EU.  
As it is known, EMU and the euro have been existing for more than seven (almost eight) 
years. Prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999, it was expected that EMU would bring 
some important economic benefits for its members. Today, after almost eight years of EMU, 
the overall performance of the euro-area economy is rather mixed. On the one hand, there 
are  some  important  successes,  such  as  providing  greater  macroeconomic  stability  within 
EMU, but on the other, there are also some significant problems in the euro area, such as its 
disappointing  growth  performance  in  recent  years,  high  and  persistent  unemployment, 
relatively  high  budget  deficit  and  public  debt  ratios,  etc.  There  are  opinions  that  this 
disappointing performance of the euro area in terms of growth and job creation is mainly due 
to  the  lack  of  progress  in  carrying  out  and  completing  structural  reforms  in  the  Member 
States. This seems to be true, but at the same time this is only part of the picture. Therefore, 
when  trying  to  find  relevant  solutions  in  order  to  contribute  to  improving  the  growth 
performance of the euro area, it is necessary to propose not only undertaking and conducting 
structural reforms by the Member States, as well as consolidating their public finances, but 
also reviewing the present framework of economic governance and coordination within the 
euro area (notabene, the same is related to the EU as well).  
With  reference  to  the  latter,  i.e.  economic  governance  and  coordination  of  economic  / 
budgetary  policies  within  the  euro  area,  it  is  apparent  that  there  are  many  serious 
weaknesses  concerning  the  present  economic  framework.  For  that  reason,  it  would  be 
desirable  to  reform  or  change  this  framework  in  order  to  make  it  more  conducive  to 
conducting  more  efficient  economic  policy  in  the  euro  area.  The  term  “more  efficient 
economic  policy”  means  such  a  policy  framework  that  would  be  successful  not  only  in 
ensuring a stability-oriented macroeconomic environment within the euro area, but also in 
effective translating this macroeconomic stability into relatively strong, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth  and  creating  more  and  better  jobs  (i.e.  primary  objectives  of  both  the 
Treaty  and  the  Lisbon  Strategy).  Such  an  economic  policy  framework  should  be  able  to 
internalize  some  (or  preferably  all)  externalities  of  regional/national  policies  and  spillover 
Concluding remarksConcluding remarks
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 128
 





              







          




















            




























            

            



























             


             
           Concluding remarks
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 10
 






















           

          




               




































            

ReferencesReferences
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 12
 
           






























             








              











              

       
             





           
References
WORKING PAPER No. 39 1
 

            






             










          

           

            
           







             
















              















N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 14
 

            


          







             

          





























           


             

             






































            


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 
































             
         

            
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